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ARGUMENT 
I. 
NIELSEN IS BOUND BY THE WRITTEN 
LEASE AGREEMENT HE SIGNED. 
Nielsen's brief discusses some principles of basic contract law at length and 
attempts to stretch certain of these principles to fit the facts of this case. Significantly, 
though, Nielsen fails meaningfully to address a controlling legal argument set forth in 
the Colbys' brief - that Utah law holds a lease enforceable against the party by whom it 
is made. Since there is no dispute that Nielsen owned the land and signed the written 
lease, this fact alone is determinative and requires that the district court be reversed as 
a matter of law. 
Nielsen asserts that the case of Commercial Union Associates v. Clayton, 863 
P.2d 29 (Utah App. 1993) is factually distinguishable, but his argument is unavailing. 
The holding in Clayton, based on Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3, is that a lease signed by 
the lessor is enforceable as against the lessor: 
By its own ambiguous terms, section 25-5-3 requires only 
the signature of the lessor to take the document out of the 
statute of frauds. 
Id. at 33 (emphasis added). That holding is clearly controlling here where Nielsen 
admits he signed the written lease. Furthermore, it is significant that both parties 
conducted themselves thereafter consistently with the terms of the written lease. This 
conduct would be sufficient to bind them, even if the lease had not been signed. Id. 
at 34. 
Similarly, Nielsen makes no attempt to distinguish the case of Edwards Pet 
Supply v. Bentley, 652 P.2d 889 (Utah 1982), which also holds that the signature of the 
lessor is sufficient to render the lease enforceable as between the parties. Given the 
specific and controlling Utah precedent, Nielsen's reliance on general contract law is 
inapposite and unpersuasive. 
II. 
THE LEASE WAS ACCEPTED BY PERFORMANCE. 
Nielsen alleges that the Colbys never accepted the lease. (Brief of Appellee 
at 5.) This argument is factually and legally erroneous. It is undisputed that the Colbys 
and Nielsen both performed in accordance with the terms of the written lease after it 
was signed: The Colbys immediately began paying substantially increased rent and 
Nielsen accepted the payments for an extended period of time.1 The Colbys increased 
their stock in reliance on the lease and performed under the lease in all other 
particulars, as set forth in their opening brief. In accordance with Utah law as stated in 
Clayton, this performance also bound the parties to the terms of the written lease. 
1
 Nielsen tacitly acknowledges that the increased rent began with the 
written lease and does not argue with the Colbys' assertion that both parties altered 
and initialed the annual and monthly rent figures. The Colbys believe these initials also 
satisfy all required formalities. 
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III. 
THE ALLEGED CONDITIONS PRECEDENT 
ARE NOT DETERMINATIVE. 
Nielsen's principal argument is that the written lease was not enforceable 
because certain conditions precedent were not met, i.e. Marie Colby was to sign the 
copy of the lease left with Carl Colby, the Colbys' signatures were to be notarized, and 
then that copy was to be returned to Nielsen. It is apparent from the record that these 
alleged "conditions," if actually discussed by the parties, were no more than additional 
formalities of execution made by oral request at the same time Carl Colby and Nielsen 
t igned the written lease.2 As demonstrated, Nielsen's signature alone is sufficient to 
re nder the lease enforceable against him. 
The lease itself demonstrates that the alleged "conditions" were not conditions 
precedent to the validity of the lease. Significantly, the written lease does not refer in 
any way to these so-called conditions. The silence of the lease on this point dooms 
Nielsen's argument because the question of whether requirements amount to 
conditions precedent is determined by the contract language and the intent of the 
parties. Clayton, 863 P.2d at 38. 
2
 Nielsen argues that certain statements by the Colbys' prior counsel 
somehow c< ntrol. (Brief of Appellee, at 4.) As explained in the Colbys' opening brief, 
these incorrect statements were made when the Colbys were not present. More 
importantly, t ley were promptly corrected by sworn affidavits filed with the court in 
connection w h the motions for reconsideration and for relief from judgment. 
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Second, the lease declares itself to have "binding effect" upon the parties as of 
October 1, 1995, without reference to other conditions (See Sections 1, 18.07 of the 
lease, R., pp. 73, 81). And third, the written lease contains an integration clause 
stating that it may only be modified in writing signed by the parties. (See Section 
18.03, R., p. 80). Notably, Nielsen has never argued that the written lease was ever 
amended to set forth these additional "conditions." 
None of the cases cited by Nielsen is persuasive. In Morris v. Mountain States 
Tel. & Tel. Co., 658 P.2d 1199 (Utah 1983), cited by Nielsen for the principle that the 
district court could interpret the contract as a matter of law to "contain conditions 
precedent," the case before the court involved a written contract found to be 
unambiguous with no conditions precedent. It is not authority for the proposition 
advanced by Nielsen, i.e. that a court may imply oral conditions into a written contract 
as a matter of law without first finding ambiguity. A finding of ambiguity, of course, is 
required before extraneous evidence is considered. Id. at 1200. No such finding was 
made here. Similarly, the case of Equitable Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Ross, 849 P.2d 1187 
(Utah App. 1993) involved a course of written offers and counteroffers, and is thus 
again factually distinguishable. 
Other cases state only basic tenants of contract law in factually dissimilar 
contexts, such as Wadsworth Const, v. City of St. George, 865 P.2d 1373 (Utah App. 
1993), which involved a construction dispute in which there was no formal agreement 
and the issue was whether a contract was ever formed. The case of Medics Serv. 
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Group v. Boise Lodge, 878 P.2d 789 (Idaho App. 1994) involved a written condition 
precedent, but the dispute was whether it had been waived by the parties' conduct --
not whether the condition precedent existed. In sum, Nielsen cites to no cases (and the 
Colbys are aware of none) where an orally requested formality of execution is 
thereafter held as a matter of law to be a condition precedent to an integrated written 
lease. 
The issue of the so-called conditions precedent is really a red herring. Nielsen's 
claims in this regard might be relevant if he were trying to enforce the lease and the 
Colbys had raised the issue of non-execution in defense. That is not the case at bar. 
Nielsen in fact signed the lease and the Colbys performed under it. This is as far as 
the inquiry need go. The Colbys are entitled to the protection of the written lease 
Nielsen signed and they performed. 
IV. 
NIELSEN IS ESTOPPED FROM DENYING 
THE VALIDITY OF THE WRITTEN LEASE. 
Nielsen does not make any attempt to refute the Colbys' argument of estoppel, 
except generally to allege that he gave the Colbys no basis to rely on the terms of the 
written lease. In fact, Nielsen did give the Colbys a basis to rely by accepting the 
substantially increased rent, in accordance with the written lease, for a period of 
months. The Colbys believed the signed written lease was valid and demonstrated that 
belief by paying the increased rent, by promoting their business at the location of the 
5 
leased premises, and by not pursuing relocation. It was error for the trial court to hold 
to the contrary, at least as a matter of law. 
V. 
SUMMARY EVICTION WAS IMPROPER. 
Whether a year-to-year or a month-to-month tenancy was created by the parties' 
actions is also an issue preserved below. Contrary to the assertions in Nielsen's brief, 
more has been shown than mere payment of rent on a monthly basis. The written 
lease expressly states that rent is based on an annual sum. This term was obviously 
agreed, altered and initialed by the parties. It thus gives the Colbys at least a one-year 
leasehold. Evershed v. Berry, 436 P.2d 438 (Utah 1968).3 Accordingly, the district 
court's summary eviction, assuming that a month-to-month tenancy existed, was 
erroneous. 
Nielsen mischaracterizes contested facts as legal conclusions when he states 
that the Colbys understood that Nielsen's request that a copy of the lease be signed by 
Marie Colby, notarized and returned to him was somehow an express condition 
precedent to the formation of the lease. Obviously, the parties' intent with respect to 
this formality of execution is vigorously disputed, and it was simply not established as a 
3
 Nielsen cites this case for the proposition that evidence of payment and 
receipt of rent, and "nothing more," results in a tenancy of "at most" year-to-year. (Brief 
of Appellee, at 10.) Absent the written lease, a yearly tenancy is clearly established 
here, rendering the trial court's judgment incorrect. As noted, the Colbys demonstrated 
much more than mere rent payments as a basis for their tenancy - they had a lease 
signed by their landlord. 
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matter of law that the parties intended these formalities of execution to be conditions 
precedent to the validity of their lease. If that was the basis of the trial court's order, it 
was error. 
CONCLUSION 
The written lease is enforceable against Nielsen. He signed it, the parties 
performed in accordance with its terms, and he is estopped from now denying its 
validity. The formalities alleged by Nielsen to be conditions precedent were not 
understood as such by the Colbys, who believed they were in possession under a two-
year lease. For the reasons set forth herein and in the Colbys' opening brief, the trial 
court's ruling was erroneous. It should be reversed and the Colbys should be awarded 
their costs and attorney's fees, as provided in Section 18.08 of the lease (R., p. 81). 
Dated this 1st day of May, 1997. 
CLYDE, SNOW & SWENSON 
EDWIN C. BARNES 
ANNELI R. SMITH 
AMANDA D. SEEGER 
Attorneys For Defendants 
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